The notion of bisimulation is an important concept in process algebra and modern modal logic. This paper explores the notion of B-similarity, which is a kind of bisimulation between preferential models. We characterize the equivalence of preferential models in terms of B-similarity. However, this result is applicable only for preferential models of finite depth. To overcome this defect, we introduce a weak notion of similarity called M-similarity, and obtain a result corresponding to Hennessy-Milner Theorem and Keisler-Shelah's Isomorphism Theorem in modal logic and first-order logic, respectively. As its application, we investigate the expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions (BCA, for short), and prove that BCAs are the fragments of first-order language preserved under M-similarity. Moreover, we obtain a characterization for elementary classes defined by BCAs. A notion of first-order translation originating from modal logic plays an important role in this paper. In order to illustrate that first-order translation is a powerful tool in the study of nonmonotonic logic, some model-theoretic results about preferential models are proved based on this translation. 27 When we consider only image-finite Kripke models [2] , there is a more succinct result so-called Hennessy-Milner Theorem which states that modal equivalence is coincident with bisimulation for image-finite models. These theorems play a similar role as Keisler-Shelah's Isomorphism Theorem in first-order logic [7] , which asserts that two first-order models are elementarily equivalent if and only if they have isomorphic ultrapowers.
Introduction
The notion of bisimulation is a familiar concept in modal logic and process algebra, which supplies us with powerful tools for investigating properties of Labeled Transition System (LTS, for short) [2, 14, 13, 16] . Roughly speaking, a bisimulation is a relation between two LTSs in which related states have identical atomic information and matching transition possibilities. It is well known that bisimulation provides a method to characterize modal equivalence, more formally, the following theorem is fundamental in modal logic [2] :
Let be a modal similarity type, and let M 1 and M 2 be -models, and w 1 and w 2 two states in M 1 and M 2 , respectively. Then, w 1 and w 2 satisfy the same modal formulas (i.e., w 1 and w 2 are modally equivalent) if and only if there exists a bisimulation between ultrafilter extensions of M 1 and M 2 which links principal ultrafilters generated by w 1 and w 2 , respectively.
For any preferential models W 1 and W 2 for the same language, if |∼ W 1 = |∼ W 2 then W 1 will be said to be equivalent to W 2 and denoted by W 1 ≡ W 2 .
First-order models and ultraproducts
A first-order language consists of three kinds of symbols: relation symbols, function symbols and constant symbols. Since this paper concerns only first-order languages without function symbols, we assume that does not contain function symbols when we recall some related concepts and results from first-order model theory. More general definitions may be found in [7] . This paper denotes relation symbols and constant symbols by capital Latin letters P and lower case Latin letters c with subscripts, respectively. Each relation symbol P of is associated with a natural number n 1, which means P is an n-placed relation. A language is said to be a simple expansion of if ⊆ and all symbols in but not in are constant symbols. In this case, may be written as = ∪ X, where X is the set of new constant symbols.
A model for is a pair A, , where, A is the domain of which is a nonempty set, and is an interpretation function such that, for any n-placed relation symbol P in , (P ) is an n-placed relation over A, and for any constant symbol c, (c) ∈ A. As usual, we denote (P ) (resp. (c)) by P (resp. c ). A model 1 = A 1 , 1 is said to be a submodel of 2 = A 2 , 2 if A 1 ⊆ A 2 , 1 (c) = 2 (c) for each constant symbol c in and, for each relation symbol P in , 1 (P ) is the restriction of 2 (P ) to A 1 .
Let a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n be a sequence in A and (x 1 . . . x n ) a first-order formula whose free variables are among x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n . The notation [a 1 . . . a n ] means that formula (x 1 · · · x n ) is satisfied in the model under the assignment [a 1 . . . a n ], whose formal definition may be found in [7] . The theory of , in symbols Th( ), is the set of all sentences (i.e., formulas without free variables) which are true in . Two first-order models are said to be elementarily equivalent if they have the same theory. Let (x 1 . . . x n ) be a set of first-order formulas and every formula in (x 1 . . . x n ) contains at most the variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n free, [a 1 . . . a n ] means that [a 1 . . . a n ] for each (x 1 . . . x n ) in (x 1 . . . x n ). The set (x 1 . . . x n ) is said to be realized in if, for some sequence a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ A, we have [a 1 . . . a n ]. Otherwise, we say that omits (x 1 . . . x n ). Let I be a nonempty set and D an ultrafilter over I. Suppose i is a model for each i ∈ I . The Cartesian product of A i (i ∈ I ) (notation: i∈I A i ) is the set of all functions f with domain I such that f (i) ∈ A i for each i ∈ I . For any two functions f, g ∈ i∈I A i , f and g are said to be D-equivalent, in symbols f = D g, if and only if {i ∈ I : f (i) = g(i)} ∈ D. We use f D to denote the equivalence class {g ∈ i∈I A i : f = D g}. As usual, we use D i to denote the ultraproduct of { i } i∈I modulo D. The formal definition of the ultraproduct may be found in [7] . In the case when all the models i are the same, say i = , the ultraproduct may be written D , and is called the ultrapower of modulo D.
The following result is the 'fundamental theorem' of ultraproducts, which is an important and basic theorem in first-order model theory.
Theorem 2.1. Let I be a nonempty set, and let D be an ultrafilter over I and i be a model for first-order language for each i ∈ I . Then
(1) Given any formula (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of and f 1 D . . . f n D ∈ D A i , we have (2) For any sentence of , Proof. See Theorem 4.1.9 in [7] .
For any two models 1 and 2 for the same language, 1 is an elementary submodel of 2 iff 1 is a submodel of 2 and for all formulas (x 1 . . . x n ) and all elements a 1 . . . a n in 1 , we have 1 [a 1 . . . a n ] iff 2 [a 1 . . . a n ]. An elementary embedding of 1 into 2 is an isomorphism f of 1 onto an elementary submodel of 2 , denoted by f : 1 2 . Let I be a nonempty set, D an ultrafilter over I and a model. The natural embedding d of into D is the function d such that, for any a ∈ A, d(a) is the equivalence class of the constant function with value a, i.e., d(a) = f D , where f (i) = a for each i ∈ I . It is well known that d : D .
First-order translation
In order to explore the relationship between modal logic and first-order logic, modal logicians introduced a technology called standard translation [2] , which provides an avenue to use results and techniques from first-order model theory and plays an important role in establishing the correspondence theory in modal logic [2] . This paper borrows this technology and introduces a similar translation for preferential inferences.
We first define our correspondence languages-that is, the languages we will translate conditional assertions into. For a proposition language, let be the first-order language with equality which consists of unary relation symbols P 0 , P 1 , . . . corresponding to the proposition letters p 0 , p 1 , . . . in , and an binary relation symbol R. Definition 3.1. Let x be a first-order variable. The translation function Tr x (·) taking propositional formulas in to first-order formulas in is defined as follows:
Clearly, for any preferential model M for , since M provides an interpretation for each symbol in , it can act as a first-order model for the language . Formally, we have the following definition: Definition 3.2. Given a preferential model M = S, l, ≺ for a language , the model M = S, R M , P M p∈ for the first-order language is defined as follows:
(2) P M = def p M = {s ∈ S : l(s) p} for any p ∈ . Lemma 3.1. Let M = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model for a language . For any formula and s ∈ S, we have
Proof. (1) By induction on the complexity of ; (2) Immediately follows from (1) We now turn to another translation function (·) • , which translates conditional assertions into first-order sentences. In fact, translating conditional assertions into other languages has appeared in the literature, for instance, Boutilier presents a method for translating them into modal formulas [6] . Definition 3.3. The translation function (·) • taking conditional assertions in to first-order sentences in is defined as follows:
Given a preferential relation |∼ in , we define |∼ • as
Clearly, |∼ • is a set of first-order sentences of . Lemma 3.3. Let M = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model. For any formula and , the following are equivalent: 
As an immediate consequence of the above lemma, we obtain We know that, for any preferential model M for , M is a first-order model for . In reverse, given a model for such that: (1) ∀x¬R(x, x), (2) ∀x∀y∀z(R(x, y) ∧ R(y, z) → R(x, z)), and (3) smooth( ), for any ∈ Form( ). then induces a preferential model M = S, l, ≺ for described as follows: (4) S is the domain of . (5) For any s ∈ S, l(s) = {p ∈ : s ∈ P }. 1 (6) ≺= R . Thus, given a preferential model W , since W satisfies the conditions (1), (2) and (3), by Theorem 2.1, so does the ultrapower D W for any ultrafilter D. Hence, D W can induce a preferential model M D W in the above manner.
Convention: In the following, for convenience, we denote the preferential model M D W by D W . On the other hand, we also denote the ultrapower D W by D W when we can understand the meaning of D W from its context.
Theorem 3.5. For any preferential model W and ultrafilter D, we have
(1) D W is a preferential model. Clearly, without the above convention, the notation D W in the conclusions (1) and (2) (resp., (3)) should be written as M D W (resp., D W ).
B-similarity between preferential models
This section will introduce and explore a notion of similarity, which may be regarded as the 'preferential model' version of the notion of similarity for epistemic states introduced by Bochman in [5] . Thus, we will prefix the name of similarity with a 'B' for 'Bochman'. Definition 4.1. Let M 1 = S 1 , l 1 , ≺ 1 and M 2 = S 2 , l 2 , ≺ 2 be two preferential models, and T 1 , T 2 subsets of S 1 , S 2 , respectively. We will say that T 1 dominates T 2 (notation:
Definition 4.2. Let M 1 = S 1 , l 1 , ≺ 1 and M 2 = S 2 , l 2 , ≺ 2 be two preferential models for the same language. M 1 will be said to be semi-B-similar to M 2 (notation:
Lemma 4.1. Let M 1 = S 1 , l 1 , ≺ 1 and M 2 = S 2 , l 2 , ≺ 2 be two preferential models for a language . Then
Proof. It is enough to show that l 1 (min( M 1 )) ⊆ l 2 (min( M 2 )) for any formula .
Let be any formula and m ∈ l 1 (min( M 1 )). Thus, l 1 (s 1 ) = m for some state s 1 ∈ min( M 1 ). Since M 2 → B M 1 , there exists a state s 2 ∈ S 2 such that (1) l 1 (s 1 ) = l 2 (s 2 ) = m, and
We will show that s 2 ∈ min( M 2 ). Suppose not. Since l 2 (s 2 ) , by the smoothness of M 2 , there exists a state t 2 ∈ S 2 such that t 2 ≺ 2 s 2 and t 2 ∈ min( M 2 ). So, by (2), there exists a state t 1 ∈ S 1 such that t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 and It is easy to see that the relation ↔ B is indeed an equivalence relation. Now for a fundamental question: is the converse of the above theorem true? That is, whether the equivalence of two preferential models implies that they are B-similar? The answer is no because of the following two counterexamples. Let be an infinite language, and let m and n be valuations such that m = n. Consider the following two injective models:
where id 1 and id 2 are the identity functions over U − {n} and U − {m}, respectively, and U is the set of all valuations. By the infiniteness of the language, it is easy to see that Nonetheless, it is possible to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2. To this end, let's firstly recall a basic concept from first-order model theory which will play an important role in the following work. Let be a model for first-order language and X ⊆ A, where A is the domain of . The expansion ( , a) a∈X is a model for ∪ {c a : a ∈ X} which has the same interpretations for old symbols as , and interprets c a by a itself for each a ∈ X. Let (x) be a set of formulas of . (x) is said to be consistent with the theory of if the set (x) ∪ Th( ) can be realized. Consequently, by the compactness, (x) is consistent with Th( ) if and only if every finite subset of (x) is realized in some model of Th( ). 2 Definition 4.4. Let be a cardinal. A model for first-order language is said to be -saturated iff for every subset X ⊆ A (the domain of ) of power |X| < , the expansion ( , a) a∈X realizes every set (x) of the language ∪ {c a : a ∈ X} which is consistent with the theory of ( , a) a∈X .
It is easy to see that, if is -saturated then it is -saturated for any cardinal < . For convenience, we recall a notion introduced in [18] as follows. Proof. It is enough to show that, for any formula , we have
Since the claim is trivial when is empty, we assume it is nonempty. Let m ∈ Val( ) such that m C M ( ). We set
Now we demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1. Let 0 (x) be any nonempty finite subset of m (x). Then, there exists an element v ∈ S M such that:
is the only element in 0 (x). Since = ∅, by the smoothness, min( ) = ∅. Clearly, for any v ∈ min( ), we have
Next, we consider another case in which 0 
Thus, we have
So, M ( |∼¬ ) • . Further, by Lemma 3.3, we get ¬ ∈ C M ( ), which contradicts m C M ( ) and m . Hence, there exist some states in S M satisfying the conditions (1) and (2) . Claim 2. m ∈ l(min( )).
Hence, m ∈ l(min( )), as desired. Now we return to the proof of the lemma. By Claim 2, we get
On the other hand, the opposite inclusion can be proved trivially. So, the proof is complete.
Consequently, by Proposition 4.3 and Lemma 4.4, all finite preferential models are P-saturated. Lemma 4.5. Let M = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model for a language and M be 0 -saturated, and let m ∈ Val( ) and be a nonempty set of formulas of . Then M satisfies the following condition (4.1):
If m ∈ l(min( 0 )) for any nonempty finite subset 0 of then there exists s ∈ S such that
Proof. Let m be any valuation such that m ∈ l(min( 0 )) for any nonempty finite subset 0 of . We put
Clearly, it suffices to prove that (x) is realized in M . Further, since M is 0 -saturated, we only need to show that any finite subset of (x) is realized in M .
Let 0 (x) be any finite subset of (x). If 0 (x) ⊆ m (x), then 0 (x) is realized by any t ∈ S such that l(t) = m. Since = ∅ and m ∈ l(min( 0 )) for any nonempty finite subset 0 of , such states must exist. Next, we consider another case in which
We set
Clearly, 0 is a finite subset of . So, m ∈ l(min( 0 )), hence, there exists a state s ∈ S such that l(s) = m and s ∈ min( 0 ). Consequently, by (3) Since Tr y 0 = ∈ 0 Tr y ( ), we get
Hence, we obtain
On the other hand, for any ∈ 0 ⊆ , since m ∈ l(min( )), we have l(s) , i.e., M Tr
By the way, it is obvious that condition (4.1) in the above lemma is implied by the following condition (4.2):
We now take up the questions: Does condition (4.1) imply (4.2)? For any preferential model M, does 0 -saturation of M imply (4.2)? Both answers are no because of the proposition as follows: Proposition 4.6. Let M = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model for a language . If M is 0 -saturated then the following are equivalent:
(i) M satisfies condition (4.2).
(ii) |∼ M satisfies the following condition WDR:
, for any formulas and .
Proof. (i ⇒ ii) Let both and be any formula. Assume that, for some formula , we have ∈ C M ( ∨ ) and
So, by Lemma 4.4, , ∈ (m). Further, by the condition (i), there exists a state s ∈ S such that l(s) = m and s ∈ min( ) ∩ min( ). Since
The condition WDR is introduced by Freund in order to characterize injective inference relations [8] . In the finite framework, Freund obtains a representation theorem for preferential relations satisfying the condition WDR in terms of injective preferential models as follows:
Let be a logical finite language and |∼ a preferential inference relation in . Then, the relation |∼ satisfies WDR if and only if there exists an injective preferential model W such that |∼ = |∼ W .
Unfortunately, the above result is false if the language is infinite [15] . In the literature [8] , a notion of standard model is defined, which is a special kind of injective model. An injective preferential model W = S, l, ≺ is said to be a standard model if mod(C W ( )) = {l(s) : s ∈ min( )} for any formula . Thus, an injective model is standard if and only if it is P-saturated. In [18] , a notion of a valuation structure is defined, which consists of worlds ordered by a binary relation introduced in [17] . A canonical approach is also presented, through which we can obtain an injective preferential model for any preferential relation satisfying WDR. In particular, the following representation result is established, which provides the semantical characterization for the family of all preferential inference relations satisfying WDR:
A preferential inference relation |∼ satisfies WDR if and only if there exists a standard model W such that
For any preferential model M, there exists a 0 -saturated model M * such that M ≡ M * (see Theorem 4.11 in this paper). However, it is false that any preferential model satisfies the condition WDR. In fact, WDR does not always hold even for injective models [15] . Thus, by Proposition 4.6, the conditions (4.1) and (4.2) are not equivalent.
Remark. From the proofs of Lemmas 4.4, 4.5 and Proposition 4.6, it is easy to see that we only need 1-saturation for these proofs to go through. Now, let's return to our subject matter. In order to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2, we need to recall a notion introduced in [1] . A preferential model W is said to be parsimonious iff for every state s ∈ S there is a formula such that s ∈ min( ) [1] . Clearly, given a preferential M = S, l, ≺ , the restriction model of M to the set {s : s ∈ S and s ∈ min( ) for some formula } is parsimonious. Formally, we have Proposition 4.7. Let M = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model. Then the preferential model M * is parsimonious, where M * = S * , l * , ≺ * is defined as follows:
(1) S * = {s : s ∈ S and s ∈ min( ) for some formula }.
Proof. Straightforward.
The above construction induces a mapping par : M → M * . Obviously, M ≡ par(M) and, for any formula , l(min( M )) = l * (min( par(M) )). Moreover, if M is P-saturated then so is par(M). Lemma 4.8. Let W be a preferential models for a language and W be 0 -saturated, and let s ∈ S W . Suppose that s / ∈ min( ) for any formula . Then, there exists a state t ∈ S W such that t ≺ s and l(t) = l(s).
Proof. We put
where l(s) = m and c s is a new constant symbol interpreted by s in the model ( W , s). To prove this lemma, we need the following auxiliary result:
On the other hand, W Tr z ( )[s] comes from l(s) . Therefore, by (3) from Lemma 3.1, we get s ∈ min( ), which contradicts the assumption that s / ∈ min( ) for any formula . Now we can arrive the conclusion as desired. Since W is 0 -saturated, by the above claim, (x) is realized in ( W , s). So, there exists a state t ∈ S W such that t ≺ s and l(t) = l(s).
In the following, a preferential model S, l, ≺ is said to be well founded if there are no infinite sequences decreasing with respect to ≺, that is, no infinite sequences s 0 ,
Lemma 4.9. Let W i be a preferential model for a language and W i be 0 -saturated, for i = 1, 2. If W 1 is well founded then
Proof. For i = 1, 2, we denote par(W i ) = S i , l i , ≺ i by M i . Since W i is 0 -saturated, by Lemma 4.4, M i is P-saturated. Let s 1 ∈ S 1 and l 1 (s 1 ) = m. We now prove that there exists a state s 2 ∈ S 2 satisfying the following conditions.
(1) l 2 (s 2 ) = m.
Since M 1 is parsimonious, there exists a formula such that s 1 ∈ min( M 1 ). We set
From C M 2 ( ) ⊆ C M 1 ( ) and m C M 1 ( ), we have m C M 2 ( ). Further, since M 2 is P-saturated, it is easy to see that (m) = ∅. We shall show that there exists a state s 2 ∈ (m) satisfying the condition (2). Suppose not. Then, for any s ∈ (m), there exists a state t ∈ S 2 such that (3) t ≺ 2 s, and (4)
. Now, for each s ∈ (m), we choose a state t s ∈ S 2 satisfying the above conditions (3) and (4). To induce a contradiction, we need to show the following claims. Claim 1. There exists a state t 1 ∈ S 1 such that t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 .
Suppose not. Then, m ∈ l 1 (min( true M 1 )). Since M 2 is P-saturated and |∼ W 2 ⊆ |∼ W 1 , there exists a state s ∈ S 2 such that l 2 (s) = m and s ∈ min( true M 2 ).
Further, from m , we get s ∈ min( M 2 ), so, s belongs to (m) and there is no t ∈ S 2 such that t ≺ 2 s, which contradicts the assumption.
Claim 2.
For any s ∈ (m), there exists a formula s such that l 2 (t s ) ¬ s and, for any
Let s be any state in (m), and let c s 1 be a new constant symbol interpreted by s 1 itself in ( M 1 , s 1 ) and ( W 1 , s 1 ). We put
Clearly, t s (x) is a set of formulas of the first-order language ∪ {c s 1 }. Since l 1 (t) = l 2 (t s ) for any t ≺ 1 s 1 , the model ( M 1 , s 1 ) omits the set t s (x) . We now verify that the model ( W 1 , s 1 ) omits the set t s (x) too.
Assume not. Thus, for some state
for any formula . Consequently, by Lemma 4.8, there exists a state t 2 ∈ S W 1 such that:
(
for any formula , and there exists a state t 3 ∈ S W 1 such that t 3 ≺ W 1 t 2 and l W 1 (t 2 ) = l W 1 (t 3 ). Iterating this process, we obtain an infinite decreasing chain:
Hence, a contradiction follows from the well-foundedness of W 1 . Therefore, ( W 1 , s 1 ) omits t s (x), as desired. Further, since W 1 is 0 -saturated, for some finite subset 0 ⊆ t s (x), ( W 1 , s 1 ) omits 0 . From the above claim,
Clearly, l 2 (t s ) ¬ s and, for any t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 , we have l 1 (t 1 ) s , otherwise, by Claim 1, 0 can be realized by some state t ∈ S 1 such that t ≺ 1 s 1 in ( W 1 , s 1 ).
Clearly, since m , we have m 0 .
For any t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 , from s 1 ∈ min( M 1 ), we have l 1 (t 1 ) ¬ . Further, since l 1 (t 1 ) s for each s ∈ (m), we have
we get m C W 2 0 . Moreover, since W 2 is 0 -saturated, by Lemma 4.4, we obtain m ∈ l W 2 (min( 0 W 2 )).
Claim 4.
There exists a state s * ∈ S 2 such that s * ∈ ∈ min( M 2 ) and l 2 (s * ) = m.
From the above claim and Lemma 4.5, since W 2 is 0 -saturated, there exists a state s * ∈ W 2 such that l W 2 (s * ) = m and s * ∈ ∈ min( W 2 ). Further, since M 2 = par(W 2 ), we have s * ∈ ∈ min( M 2 ) and l 2 (s * ) = m. Now we can get a contradiction as desired. Since ∈ , we have s * ∈ (m). However, by the assumption, there exists a state t s * ∈ S 2 such that t s * ≺ 2 s * , moreover, by Claim 2, we obtain l 2 (t s * ) ∨ ¬ s * . Consequently, a contradiction follows from s * ∈ min( ∨ ¬ s * M 2 ). Corollary 4.10. Let W i be a preferential model and W i be 0 -saturated, for i = 1, 2. If both W 1 and W 2 are well founded, then
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 4.9.
Remark. From the proofs of Lemmas 4.8 and 4.9, it is easy to see that we only need 2-saturation for these proofs to go through.
We now turn our attention to the existence of 0 -saturated preferential models. Before this issue is addressed, we recall some basic concepts and results from first-order model theory [7] .
Let Let be an infinite cardinal. An ultrafilter D over I is said to be -good iff it satisfies the following condition: for every cardinal < and every monotonic function f on S ( ) into D, there exists an additive function g on S ( ) into D such that g f . An ultrafilter D is said to be countably incomplete if there exists a countable set E ⊆ D such that ∩E / ∈ D. Proof. Let I be any set of power such that 0 + | | < . Then, there exists an + -good countably incomplete ultrafilter D over I, 4 where + is the least cardinal greater than . From < + , D is -good. Hence, the ultrapower D M is -saturated. 5 Since However, in order to show a restricted converse to Theorem 4.2, we expect that M * is well founded. But, an ultraproduct D M can not insure this even if M is well founded. 6 Thus, we introduce the following notion. Proof. Suppose that the length of any chain contained in M is smaller than n and D M contains the following infinite decreasing chain:
Then, the model M contains a chain with the length n + 1 as follows:
Thus, a contradiction raises, as desired. Obviously, for any preferential models M 1 and M 2 such that both par(M 1 ) and par(M 2 ) have finite depth, M 1 ≡ M 2 if and only if par( D par(M 1 )) ↔ B par( D par(M 2 )) for some ultrafilter D. By the way, D par(M) is isomorphism to par( D M) for any finite model M. In the rest of this section, we will show that the above theorem may be expressed in a more succinct form. Hence, for any preferential model M, if M is well-founded and M is 0 -saturated, then M is valuation parsimonious [18] , that is, for any m ∈ l M (S M ), there exists a formula such that m ∈ l M (min( )). Proof. It is enough to show the following claims. Since ↔ B is transitive, we have the following result: Similarly, due to the transitivity of → B , we have Theorem 4.18. Let M 1 and M 2 be two preferential models, and let M 1 be of finite depth. Then the following are equivalent: Proof. For i = 1, 2, since M i is finite, M i is isomorphism to D M 2 for any ultrafilter D.
M-Similarity between preferential models
In the last section, we explore the notion of B-similarity. A limitation of Theorem 4.17 lies in that it is applicable only for preferential models of finite depth. To supply this gap, this section will introduce a weak notion of similarity called M-similarity and explore the relationship between M-similarity and equivalence of preferential models. For any preferential models, we will establish a similar result as Theorem 4.17 in terms of M-similarity. Moreover, as its application, the expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions will be investigated.
M-Similarity and equivalence
Given a preferential model M = S, l, ≺ , we will denote the set {s ∈ S : s ∈ min( ) for some formula } by MF(M). On the other hand, par(W 3 )→ par(W 2 ) and, for any , we have Furthermore, from the above proposition and Corollary 4.19, it is easy to see that Conjecture 5.3 holds for finite preferential models. Now, we turn to issue concerning the relationship between the equivalence and M-similarity.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4.1.
Definition 5.2. Let M 1 and M 2 be two preferential models for the same language. M 1 and M 2 will be said to be M-similar (notation:
Obviously, the relation ↔ is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 5.5 and Definition 5.2.
Similar to B-similarity, two equivalent preferential models do not need to be M-similar. For instance, consider W 2 and W 3 in Example 5.1. Since W 2 = par(W 3 ), we have W 2 ≡ W 3 , but W 2 ↔W 3 . The rest of this subsection will concern itself with showing a restricted converse to the above theorem.
Lemma 5.7. Let M 1 = S 1 , l 1 , ≺ 1 and M 2 = S 2 , l 2 , ≺ 2 be two preferential models for a language , and let both
Proof. Similar to Lemma 4.9. But, for the integrality, we give the proof here. Let s 1 ∈ MF(M 1 ) and l 1 (s 1 ) = m. It is enough to show that there exists a state s 2 ∈ S 2 such that
Since s 1 ∈ MF(M 1 ), we have s 1 ∈ min( M 1 ) for some formula . We put (m) = {s ∈ S 2 : s ∈ min( M 2 ) and l 2 (s) = m}.
Similar to Lemma 4.9, (m) = ∅. We will prove that there is a state s 2 ∈ (m) satisfying condition (2). Suppose not. Hence, for every s ∈ (m), there exists a state t ∈ S 2 satisfying the following conditions:
(3) t ≺ 2 s, and (4) ∀t 1 ∈ S 1 (t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 ⇒ l 1 (t 1 ) = l 2 (t)). So, for every s ∈ (m), we can choose a state t s ∈ S 2 satisfying the above conditions (3) and (4). To complete the proof, we need to demonstrate the following claims. Claim 1. There exists a state t 1 ∈ S 1 such that t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 .
Similar to Claim 1 in Lemma 4.9.
Claim 2. For any s ∈ (m), there exists a formula s such that l 2 (t s ) ¬ s and, for any
Let c s 1 be a new constant symbol interpreted by s 1 in ( M 1 , s 1 ), and let
Since l 1 (t) = l 2 (t s ) for any t ≺ 1 s 1 , the model ( M 1 , s 1 ) omits the set t s (x). Further, since M 1 is 0 -saturated, there exists a finite subset 0 ⊆ t s (x) omitted by ( M 1 , s 1 ). By Claim 1, it is easy to see that 0 ∩ l 2 (t s ) (x) = ∅. We set
Clearly, l 2 (t s ) ¬ s . On the other hand, for any t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 , we have l 1 (t 1 ) s , otherwise, by Claim 1, 0 can be realized by some state t ∈ S 1 such that t ≺ 1 s 1 .
For any nonempty finite subset 0 ⊆ , we have m ∈ l 2 (min( 0 M 2 )).
Since m , we have m 0 . For any t 1 ≺ 1 s 1 and s ∈ (m), from l 1 (t 1 ) s and s 1 ∈ min( M 1 ), we have l 1 (t 1 ) ¬( 0 ). Consequently, s 1 ∈ min( 0 M 1 ). Hence, m ∈ l 1 (min( 0 M 1 )) and m C M 1 ( 0 ).
). Now, a contradiction is raised. By Claim 3 and Lemma 4.5, since M 2 is 0 -saturated, we have s * ∈ ∈ min( M 2 ) and l 2 (s * ) = m for some state s * ∈ S 2 .
Further, s * ∈ (m) follows from ∈ . However, by the assumption and Claim 2, we get t s * ≺ 2 s * and l 2 (t s * ) ¬ s * for some state t s * ∈ S 2 . Thus, it follows that s * / ∈ min( ∨ ¬ s * M 2 ), a contradiction, as desired.
Corollary 5.8. Let M 1 and M 2 be two preferential models, and let both M 1 and M 2 be 0 -saturated. Then
Proof. Immediately follows from Lemma 5.7.
Now, we arrive at the main result of this section which plays a similar role as Keisler-Shelah's Isomorphism Theorem [7] and Hennessy-Milner Theorem [2] in first-order logic and modal logic, respectively. Theorem 5.9. For any preferential models M 1 and M 2 , we have
for some ultrafilter D. In particular, if both M 1 and M 2 are finite, then
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.11, there exists an ultrafilter D such that D M 2 and D M 1 are 0 -saturated. Then, (1) and (2) 
Expressive power of Boolean combinations of conditional assertions
From the first-order translation defined in Section 3, we know that conditional assertions may be regarded as fragments of first-order languages. This subsection will explore the characterization for first-order sentences which are equivalent to some translations of conditional assertions in terms of M-similarity. More formally, we will show that a first-order sentence is equivalent to a Boolean combination of the translations of conditional assertions if and only if it is preserved under ↔. Definition 5.3. Given a propositional language , BCA( ) is the least set satisfying the following conditions:
(1) BCA( ) is a set of sentences of first-order language .
(2) For any , ∈ Form( ), ( |∼ ) • ∈ BCA( ).
(3) If ∈ BCA( ) then ¬ ∈ BCA( ).
Any sentence in BCA( ) is said to be a boolean combination of conditional assertions. On the other hand, we use PBCA( ) to denote the least set satisfying the above conditions (1), (2) and (4), and sentences in PBCA( ) are called positive boolean combinations of conditional assertions. Proof. Proceeding by induction on the complexity of . It is easy to carry out for with the format ¬ 1 , 1 ∨ 2 and 1 ∧ 2 , where 1 , 2 ∈ BCA( ). In the case where = ( |∼ ) • for some formula , ∈ Form( ), this is done by observing that the following are equivalent: implies M 2 for any ∈ PBCA( ).
Proof. By Lemma 5.5 and proceeding by induction on , omitted.
Given a propositional language , let be a first-order sentence of the language . The formula will be said to be P -equivalent to a (positive) boolean combination of conditional assertions if and only if, for some formula ∈ BCA( ) (resp., ∈ PBCA( )), we have M iff M for any preferential model M for .
It is easy to see that the above condition (5.1) is equivalent to R(x, z) ).
As a matter of convenience, we put
If there is no ambiguity, we shall write P for P ( ). Clearly, the P-equivalence is exactly the -equivalence 8 in first-order logic if we set = P .
Theorem 5.12. Let be a propositional language and be a first-order sentence of the language . Then, is P-equivalent to a boolean combination of conditional assertions iff is preserved under ↔.
Proof. (⇒) Immediately follows from Lemma 5.10.
(⇐) Suppose that is preserved under ↔. We put
Let M be any preferential model for such that M BCA( 
Thus, P ↔ , as desired.
In model theory, a class K of models for is said to be an elementary class if, for some set of sentences of , K is defined by , that is, K is exactly the class of all models of . There exists a well known theorem so-called Elementary Class Theorem 9 which provides a characterization for elementary classes. Clearly, given a preferential relation |∼ in , the class of all preferential models for |∼ is an elementary class because it can be defined by the set P ∪|∼ • . Thus, a natural problem raises at this point, namely how to characterize this kind of elementary classes? More generally, how to characterize elementary classes of preferential models defined by sentences in BCA( ) or PBCA( )? Since conditional assertions are just fragments of first-order languages, Elementary Class Theorem does not provide answers to these questions directly. In the following, we address this issue. We firstly recall a basic theorem from model theory, which is an ultraproduct version of the compactness theorem. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is said to be closed under ↔ if, for any models M 1 and M 2 , M 1 ↔ M 2 and M 1 ∈ K implies M 2 ∈ K. Similarly, K is said to be closed under → if, for any models M 1 and M 2 , M 1 → M 2 and M 1 ∈ K implies M 2 ∈ K. K is said to be closed under ultraproducts if every ultraproduct D M i of a family of models M i ∈ K belongs to K. K is said to be closed under ultrapowers if M ∈ K implies the ultrapower D M i ∈ K for any ultrafilter D. In the following, we use K to denote the complement of K within the class of all preferential models for .
K is said to be defined by (positive) boolean combinations of conditional assertions if there exists a set ⊆ BCA( ) ( ⊆ PBCA( ), respectively) such that, for any preferential model W for , W if and only if W ∈ K, that is, the class { M : M ∈ K} is an elementary class defined by P ∪ . Moreover, if such set is finite, then, K is said to be finitely defined by boolean combinations of conditional assertions.
Theorem 5.15. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is defined by boolean combinations of conditional assertions if and only if
(1) K is closed under ↔.
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts. Let M be a preferential model for such that M . It is enough to show that M ∈ K. Let i be any finite nonempty subset of (|∼ M ) • . We will show that there exists a model W i ∈ K such that W i i. Suppose not. Then, for any W ∈ K, W ¬ ∈i . Clearly, ¬ ∈i ∈ BCA( ), so, ¬ ∈i ∈ , which contradicts M and M i. Consequently, by Theorem 5.14, there exists an ultrafilter D such that D W i (|∼ M ) • . So, D W i ≡ M, moreover, by (2), D W i ∈ K. On the other hand, by Theorem 5.9, D * ( D W i ) ↔ D * M for some ultrafilter D * . Since K is closed under ultraproducts, we have D * ( D W i ) ∈ K. Further, D * M ∈ K follows from (1). Since K is closed under ultrapowers, we obtain M ∈ K, as desired.
Corollary 5.16. Let K be a nonempty class of preferential models for a language . K is finitely defined by boolean combinations of conditional assertions if and only if
(2) K is closed under ultraproducts.
(3) K is closed under ultraproducts.
Proof. (⇐) Since K is closed under ↔, so is K. Hence, by Theorem 5.15, both K and K are defined by boolean combinations of conditional assertions. Let K and K be defined by 1 and 2 respectively. So, 1 ∪ 2 ∪ P is inconsistent. By the compactness, for some finite set 1 ⊆ 1 and 2 ⊆ 2 , 1 ∪ 2 ∪ P is inconsistent. It is easy to see that K and K is defined by 1 and 2 , respectively. (⇒) Let K be defined by finite set ⊆ BCA( ). Thus, (1) and (2) (2) and (3), we have D W ∈ K, further, W ∈ K follows from (4).
Some model-theoretic results about preferential models
Since first-order translation provides an approach of using results and methods from first-order model theory, it is a powerful tool of exploring properties of preferential models and preferential inferences. To illustrate this, we will give some model-theoretic results about preferential models. These results immediately follow from first-order translation and first-order model theory, however, it seems to me that it is nontrivial to show them without the help of first-order model theory.
In the following, for convenience, the pair S, ≺ is called a poset if the binary relation ≺ over S is transitive and irreflexive. Let be a class of posets, a preferential model S, l, ≺ is said to be from if the poset S, ≺ belongs to . We use ( ) to denote the class of all preferential models for coming from . Definition 6.1 (Zhu et al. [19] ). Let |∼ be an inference relation in and 0 a sublanguage of , the reduct of |∼ with respect to 0 is |∼ ∩ (Form( 0 )) 2 and denoted by |∼ ⇓ 0 . Definition 6.2 (Zhu et al. [19] ). Let W = S, l, ≺ be a preferential model for and 0 a sublanguage of . The reduct of W with respect to 0 is a triple S 0 , l 0 , ≺ 0 such that S 0 = S, ≺ 0 =≺, and for any s ∈ S, l 0 (s) is the reduction of l(s) with respect to 0 (i.e., l 0 (s) = l(s) ∩ 0 ). In the following, the triple S 0 , l 0 , ≺ 0 will be denoted by W ⇓ 0 . Proposition 6.1 (Compactness). Let be a class of posets which is closed under ultraproducts, and let |∼ be a preferential relation in a language . If for any finite sublanguage 0 ⊆ , the reduction |∼ ⇓ 0 has models from , then so does the relation |∼ itself.
Proof. Let = |∼ • . We demonstrate the following claims.
Claim 1.
For any i ∈ I ( ), we have M i i for some preferential model M i from ( ).
Clearly, i is a set of sentences of . We put 0 = def {p : p ∈ such that corresponding relation symbol P occurs in i}.
Since i is finite, so is 0 . So, there exists a preferential model M * i = S * i , l * i , ≺ * i from such that |∼ M * i = |∼ ⇓ 0 . Obviously, i ⊆ (|∼ M * i ) • . So, by Lemma 3.3, M * i i. Since M * i is a model for the language 0 , in order to complete the proof of this claim, we need an expansion of M * i to the language . Thus, we define M i = S i , l i , ≺ i as follows: (1) S i = S * i . (2) ≺ i =≺ * i . (3) For any p ∈ and s ∈ S i , p ∈ l i (s) iff p ∈ 0 and p ∈ l * i (s).
We will prove that M i is a preferential model for . It is enough to show M i is smooth. Let (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) be any formula of and p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n be all propositional symbols occurring in but not in 0 . It is easy to see that (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) M i = (⊥, ⊥, . . . , ⊥) M * i , where (⊥, ⊥, . . . , ⊥) is the formula obtained from (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) by substituting ⊥ for p i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Since the set (⊥, ⊥, . . . , ⊥) M * i is smooth, so is (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) M i . Hence, M i is a preferential model for and S i , ≺ i ∈ . Obviously, M i is an expansion of M * i to the language and M i i.
Claim 2.
There exists a preferential model W from such that |∼ W = |∼.
By Claim 1 and Theorem 5.14, there exists an ultrafilter D over I ( ) such that D M i . Similar to Theorem 3.5, it is easy to see that D M i is a preferential model such that |∼ D M i = |∼. Further, since is closed under ultraproducts, D M i is from .
Let be a property of posets definable by first-order language, in other words, the class { S, ≺ : S, ≺ is a poset satisfying } be an elementary class. Then, the above proposition implies that: for any inference relation |∼, if any reduct of |∼ with respect to finite sublanguage may be generated by models with the property , then so does |∼ itself. Proposition 6.2 (Existence of P-saturated model). Let be a class of posets which is closed under ultraproducts. For any language and preferential model M from , there exists a preferential model W such that:
(1) W comes from .
(2) M ≡ W .
(3) W is P-saturated.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.11.
Thus, any preferential model M has an equivalent model which is P-saturated and has the same first-order properties as M. Proposition 6.3. Let |∼ be a preferential relation in . If |∼ may be generated by some infinite preferential models, then it may be generated by infinite models of any given power .
Proof. Let = |∼ • ∪ P . Since |∼ can be generated by an infinite preferential model, has infinite model. So, by Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem 10 from first-order model theory, for any cardinal number = , has model with size . Thus, by Corollary 3.4, |∼ may be generated by infinite models of any given power .
We denote the class of all injective models for by IM( ). For any finite language , since there are only finitely many injective models up to isomorphism and those injective models are finite, the class { M : ∈ IM( )} can be characterized by a first-order sentence of the language . However, it is false when the language is infinite. Proposition 6.4. For any infinite language , the class { M : ∈ IM( )} can not be characterized by first-order sentences. In other words, it is not an elementary class of .
Proof. Suppose that there exists a set of first-order sentences of such that M iff M ∈ IM( ). Since is infinite, there exists an infinite model in I M( ) (for instance, considering an infinite antichain). Hence, has infinite models. So, by Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski Theorem, has an infinite model M with size > 2 | | . Clearly, M / ∈ IM( ), a contradiction.
Remark. A preferential model may be regarded as a Kripke model of basic modal language which contains only diamond , thus it makes perfect sense to consider whether the class I M( ) is definable by basic modal formulas.
Consequently, given an elementary class , in order to establish the representation theorem RTH( ( ), ) for any language , it is enough to consider only the finite language case.
Conclusion
In this paper we explored the notion of similarity for preferential models and characterized the equivalence of models in terms of similarity. As application of the main theorem obtained in this paper, we investigated the expressive power of conditional assertions and provided the characterization for the class of preferential models defined by Boolean combinations of conditional assertions.
First-order translation originating from modal logic is of basic importance in this paper, through which we can apply results and techniques from first-order model theory to nonmonotonic logic. Thus, we believe that first-order translation is a powerful tool in the study of nonmonotonic inference relations, moreover, such idea is useful for any nonclassical logic if its semantic may be expressed in first-order logic.
